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ABSTRACT: Understood as an analysis of clashing argument cultures, C. P. Snow’s “Two Cultures” 
illuminates challenges to interdisciplinarity. Argument cultures involve not only distinct styles of 
argumentation and background assumptions, but also emotional attitudes and prejudices, including disdain 
for other argument cultures, that rest on ideals of inquiry and society. Case studies suggest that fruitful 
interdisciplinary work across such cultures requires institutionalized boundary contexts in which 
heterogeneous solidarity can develop. 
 






This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of a single lecture that continues to draw 
comment. In his 1959 Rede Lecture on “The Two Cultures,” C. P. Snow described a 
“gulf of mutual incomprehension,” even hostility and disdain, that separated scientists 
from “literary intellectuals.” Snow attributed the split to a difference in the cultures of the 
two groups. However, scientists and literary intellectuals were not exactly on a par in his 
analysis—whereas literary intellectuals are generally opposed to the future, 
pessimistically resigned to the status quo, scientists have “the future in their bones,” 
ready to tackle the forms of immiseration that separate the majority of humanity from the 
benefits enjoyed by the developed world.1  
The rhetorical punch of Snow’s analysis relied more on sweeping 
oversimplification and anecdote than on clear-headed analysis, and his impugning of 
literary culture provoked strong critical responses. What interests me here are the 
particular elements that come together in his conception of culture, which combines the 
classical idea of intellectual development with the more recent anthropological concept of 
culture as a way of life or constellation of shared social practices. Because Snow attends 
 
1 For Snow’s Rede Lecture and his “Second Look,” I rely on Snow 1965; unattributed intralinear numbers 
refer to pages in that book. For the first major critical reactions, see Cornelius and St. Vincent 1964. 
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primarily to matters of substance, the contrasting contents of scientific and literary 
cultures, he does not develop his general conception of culture in much detail. However, 
the substantive points at issue for Snow and his critics reveal interesting connections 
between culture and argumentation. In this paper I elucidate the general features of 
Snow’s conception as a potential contribution to a contextualist argumentation theory. 
Although Snow’s substantive analysis of literary and scientific culture was open to doubt 
even in 1959, the general conception of culture operative in his analysis provides a 
framework that has relevance for understanding cultures of inquiry and discourse—what I 
refer to here as argument cultures, which are differentiated not only by characteristic 
styles of argument but also by culture-specific emotional attitudes, assumptions about the 
human condition, and visions of a good society.  
My aim, then, is two-fold: first, to clarify the conception of an argument culture as 
it operates in Snow and his critics; second, to show how the conception has broad 
relevance for understanding debates at the boundaries of science and society as clashing 
contexts of argument. I proceed as follows. To begin with, it helps to have a more precise 
sense of the two cultural groups that Snow wanted to identify, or that one might plausibly 
construe as targets of his analysis (sec. 2). I then turn to the four general features that 
constitute Snow’s operative conception of culture (sec. 3). These features allow us to 
identify argument cultures, that is, cultures understood as contexts that condition both the 
standards and substance of cogent argumentation, but that potentially clash with one 
another (sec. 4). However, as the subsequent controversy over Snow’s lecture reveals, 
argument cultures rest on a deeper difference between the characteristic common goods 
that, internal to each culture, project clashing visions of the good society (sec. 5). Such 
clashes are not uncommon in deliberative and policymaking contexts. Snow’s notion of 
culture suggests that successful mediation between argument cultures requires 
institutionalized “boundary contexts” in which heterogeneous solidarities can develop 
(sec. 6).  
Before moving on, I should remove some possible sources of misunderstanding. 
Snow’s Two Cultures is most readily situated in the ongoing discussion—dating at least 
from the nineteenth century—over the relation between science and the humanities in 
education and society (see Collini 1998; Gould 2003, pp. 89-95). That issue as such is not 
exactly my concern here; rather, I am interested in certain recurrent features of cross-
context argumentation that Snow landed on—features one can see in the controversy 
itself that flared up around his Rede Lecture. I do not claim that Snow’s analysis 
represents a conceptual innovation in thinking about science and society, though that 
might be an interesting question. In any case, in striking his particular conception of 
culture and relating it to science-intensive policymaking, Snow put his finger on a matter 
of paramount importance for postwar society—and for us today. 
 
2. JUST WHICH “CULTURES” ARE AT ISSUE? 
 
In advancing his two-cultures thesis, Snow explicitly combines the traditional intellectual  
and anthropological concepts of culture. Even if literary culture is more diverse, Snow 
insists that both it and scientific cultures display features of both concepts. On the one 
hand, each represents a kind of intellectual development or refinement of mental 
capacities; on the other hand, each qualifies as a culture in the sense of “a group of 
 2
SNOW’S ARGUMENT CULTURES 
persons living in the same environment, linked by common habits, common assumptions, 
a common way of life” (p. 64, also pp. 9, 61ff). Much of what Snow attributes to literary 
and scientific cultures thus falls under the sociological notion of ethos, understood as a 
set of attitudes, beliefs, norms, and practices characteristic of some group.  
In proposing this combination, Snow links the specific contents of intellectual 
development—the substance of knowledge—with socio-institutional context. Broadly 
speaking, this move puts him in the company of sociologists like R. K. Merton and 
Ludwig Fleck, and in some respects it anticipates the substantive sociology of 
knowledge, just over the horizon, that would develop initiatives like Fleck’s, explaining 
intellectual content in relation to the social and institutional contexts of inquiry.2 What 
stands out in Snow’s approach, however, is the emphasis he places on the emotional and 
evaluative elements of culture, more on which below.  
 But precisely which two cultures does Snow have in mind? Snow’s argument 
suggests that a particular set of intellectual and emotional attitudes is aligned with some 
fairly clear-cut social-institutional demarcations, such as the academic disciplines that 
tend to be lumped under the umbrellas of the sciences and humanities. What Snow claims 
about these two groups goes beyond the obvious fact that different disciplines have 
distinct objects of inquiry: Snow wants to combine a set of deeper attitudes, including 
emotional dispositions and visions of the good society, with sociological demarcations.  
In the case of scientific culture, the sociological demarcations provide a fairly 
secure starting point, inasmuch as the sciences have well-know institutional boundaries 
that are named as such (college departments, conferences, societies, etc). Although Snow 
considers physical scientists “most representative” of scientific culture, he also includes 
engineers and applied scientists (pp. 4, 66-68). I take it, therefore, that scientific culture, 
roughly speaking, first of all includes people trained and working as natural scientists or 
engineers; this presumably includes scientifically trained administrators engaged in 
science-intensive policymaking. The social sciences, on the other hand, seem to fall into 
what Snow later called a “third culture” of “social historians,” which he believed was 
beginning to emerge (70f).  
The social-institutional scope of literary culture presents a more difficult case. 
Although some have identified it with the humanistic disciplines, Snow seems to have 
something both wider and narrower in mind. Wider, in that he targets creative writers and 
critics and not simply academics; narrower, in that he targets fiction and poetry above all. 
Snow further complicates matters by sliding from “literary culture” to “traditional 
culture,” a move that suggests his demarcation primarily depends on intellectual attitude 
rather than on a distinct social-institutional setting. (I’ll say more about the idea of 
traditional culture in section 3.2 below.) In defending Snow, Martin Green apparently 
accepts the primacy of an intellectual demarcation when he claims that Snow’s label of 
literary intellectual “applies fully only to modern [i.e., modernist] writers and critics”; 
whether academics fall within Snow’s group of literary intellectuals depends on their 
                                                        
2 Substantive sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) was still at an embryonic stage in 1959, and would 
not fully come into the world until the 1970s, with various proposals for a sociology of scientific 
knowledge (e.g., Bloor [1978]1991). In contrast to SSK, Merton’s sociology of knowledge still focused on 
institutional conditions for good science, but it did not attempt to explain the actual content of science in 
sociological terms (Merton 1973). Going beyond Merton, SSK theorists developed earlier initiatives (e.g., 




attitude and specialization (Green 1965, pp. 15-16). Nonetheless, literary intellectuals in 
this sense have an identifiable institutional basis, namely the literary conferences “at 
which ‘modern’ writers predominate” (ibid., 18). This delimitation of scope should not 
mislead us into thinking that Snow’s intended target is a minor one: Snow holds that “the 
modernist movement includes a majority, though not all, of the high talents in western 
literature over a longish period” (p. 95), and Green notes that “Snow’s case […] is not 
inapplicable to literary men of other schools and other eras” (Green, p. 16).  
The upshot is that if the sciences form a “culture,” then Snow’s literary 
intellectuals are better regarded as a subculture within the humanities, namely those 
writers, critics, and academics whose approaches to literary invention and discourse fall 
within or draw upon the modernist tradition. This group shares a social-institutional 
context defined, on the one hand, by humanities departments, which they share with other 
intellectual subcultures, and, on the other hand, by particular conferences dominated by 
modernists. Thus Michael Yudkin has it right: “there are dozens of cultures, in Sir 
Charles’ use of the term” (1963, p. 53). But Snow himself seems to be of two minds 
regarding the scope of his cultures. On the one hand, he acknowledges the diversity in 
each culture, noting that his two-cultures analysis simplifies a spectrum of “all kinds of 
tones of feeling.” Thus literary culture includes a wide “spread of attitudes,” and wide 
gaps and misunderstandings exist between different sciences.3 More significantly, in his 
“Second Look” he concedes he made a hasty generalization to Western culture as a 
whole, based on his limited experience of English academic culture (pp. 68ff). 
Nonetheless, Snow insists that a micro-analysis would miss important commonalities 
shared by certain kinds of inquiry (pp. 66-68).  
Perhaps the proper level of analysis depends on the kind of conflict one aims to 
understand. For Snow, the significant conflict was that between humanists and scientists.4 
Given the importance Snow placed on the educational setting for each group, Collini is 
right to say that at “the heart of the ‘two cultures’ is a claim about academic disciplines,” 
which involve “two sorts of intellectual enquiry” (Collini, xliii). However, to understand 
particular cases of conflict, we may sometimes have to examine disciplinary sub-cultures. 
In any case, ambiguities in Snow’s understanding of literary culture should not put us off 
from some interesting implications of his general conception of culture. The formal 
elements of that conception, I argue, identify important factors in conflicts that arise not 
only between disciplines, but in a range of contexts in which the sciences intersect with 
society. 
 
3. THE FORMAL ELEMENTS OF SNOW’S “CULTURE” 
 
What kinds of features did Snow identify in distinguishing scientific and literary 
cultures? His analysis suggests at least four, which we might regard as formal features 
that characterize his general conception of culture: a social-institutional setting, a style of 
                                                        
3 Snow (1965, 10f). Also 31: “It is permissible to lump pure and applied scientists into the same scientific 
culture, but the gaps are wide. Pure scientists and engineers often totally misunderstand each other.”  
4 Here he had the historical record on his side—not only the long-standing concern over the split between 
the literary arts and sciences, but also the more recent episode, in the 1920s and 30s, in which humanists 
criticized scientific-technological progress (see Kevles 1979, pp. 180-84, 236-47); as Kevles (p. 181) 
explains, the self-styled “humanists” included academics, writers, and poets—hence, Snow’s “literary 
intellectuals.” 
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argument, a set of emotional dispositions, and a particular vision of the good society. I 
treat each feature in turn, noting how Snow or his critics refer to them. What matters to 
me are the kinds of features they refer to, not the accuracy of Snow’s substantive 
description of those features for science or literature. 
  
3.1 Social-institutional setting 
 
I have already touched on this aspect of culture in the previous section. As Snow 
explains, the anthropological concept of culture presupposes “a group of persons living in 
the same environment” (p. 64). Whether the environment is a geographic location, a 
network linked by the exchange of letters, or an internet site, what matters is that 
members of the culture can come together and interact in a socially organized setting that 
fosters their culture as an ethos, a set of shared assumptions and practices. This is what I 
mean by a “social-institutional setting.” Snow recognizes this environmental or 
institutional aspect of culture; indeed the gap between the two cultures arises in part 
because “[t]here seems […] to be no place where the two cultures meet” (p. 16, my 
emphasis).  
Snow identifies educational institutions as the primary social-institutional setting 
for each of the two cultures (pp. 17-21, 34). Although, as I noted earlier, Snow does not 
have exactly the humanistic disciplines in mind, his comments on English educational 
structures suggest that institutionalized disciplinary structures provide the primary 
institutional setting where each culture is, to a large extent, formed and sustained. 
Although conferences might play an important role in literary culture, writers and critics 
are located, often enough, in colleges and universities. However, what matters for my 
purposes is the general point that cultures depend on social-institutional sites, whether 
these are formally institutionalized or merely informal gathering places, where members 
can come together and sustain their identity as members of the culture in question. 
 
3.2 Style of Argumentation  
 
Each of the two cultures involves a characteristic style of argumentation. Snow is a bit 
clearer on this point for the scientific culture, which he says “contains a great deal of 
argument, usually much more rigorous, and almost always at a higher conceptual level, 
than literary persons’ arguments” (p. 12). Snow refers, I take it, to technical arguments 
that adduce evidence and mathematical considerations in support of some hypothesis or 
finding. Such arguments presumably depend on the “common standards and patterns of 
behavior [e.g., methods of inquiry], common approaches and assumptions” of scientific 
culture (p. 9). 
Snow says nothing positive about “literary persons’ arguments.” What might such 
arguments even be? Presumably, at the least, those of literary criticism, which after all 
involves a certain kind of argumentation based on the application of literary standards to 
the interpretation and evaluation of texts. However, Snow’s two major critics, F. R. 
Leavis and Lionel Trilling, suggest that literature itself involves argumentation. 
According to Trilling, literature involves a “criticism of life” (Trilling 1962, p. 468); 
Leavis argues that great literary works confront us with the question, “What, ultimately, 
do men live by?” (Leavis 1972, p. 56) Inasmuch as literary works—fiction, poetry, 
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theater, etc.—attempt to depict some aspect of human existence faithfully, in a way that 
challenges the reader personally to confirm the judgment “that the thing is so,” such 
works invite the reader into a “third realm” situated between the private realm of 
subjective experience and the public realm of detached scientific observers who quantify 
and measure (ibid., p. 62). These remarks suggest that literature invites readers and 
literary critics into a kind of argument, namely a mode of critical reflection on human 
existence that is not merely private, but calls for confirmation from others. Perhaps we 
might call this “appeal to common experience.” 
We might also understand Snow’s connection of literary culture with traditional 
culture as a point about its distinctive style of argument. As Snow points out, a hallmark 
of literary culture is familiarity with the literary canon of great authors, such as 
Shakespeare—a familiarity that scientists generally lack. To align literary culture and 
traditional culture, then, suggests that (a) disciplinary competence in the literary 
humanities involves mastery of the canon, such that one (b) is able to make cogent 
interpretive arguments about past works of literature, and (c) can judge the quality of 
creative literary innovation in light of the canon.  
 
3.3 Emotional features  
 
Judging from repeated remarks on feelings, Snow takes the emotional attitudes of a 
culture as one of its primary features. Indeed, he distinguishes the two cultures in large 
measure by their opposed feelings:  
 
The feelings of one pole become the anti-feelings of the other. If the scientists have the future in 
their bones, then the traditional culture responds by wishing the future did not exist. (p. 11) 
 
Here too, the two cultures are not quite on a par. Whereas Snow describes the scientific 
culture by the optimistic attitude of its members, who have a “social hope” that the 
conditions of material life can be improved across the globe by science and technology, 
literary intellectuals appear in largely negative, reactive terms, as the above quotation 
reveals (pp. 5-7, 9, 27). For some critics, the final straw lay in Snow’s claim that 
“[i]ntellectuals, in particular literary intellectuals, are natural Luddites” (p. 22). Snow 
means that literary intellectuals failed to understand the industrial revolution, but instead 
either “shuddered away” or reacted with “screams of horror,” not realizing that 
“[i]ndustrialization is the only hope of the poor” (p. 25).  
These emotional reactions are bound up with different visions of the good society, 
more on which shortly. Here I want to emphasize the contrasting emotional reactions that 
distinguish the two cultures for Snow: one optimistically forward-looking to a better 
future, the other negatively critical of the present society increasingly committed to 
science and technology—a negative reaction that at its worst, according to Snow, slides 
into “the most imbecile expressions of anti-social feeling” (8).5 Besides these contrasting 
feelings, Snow also notices a further feeling that the two cultures share: a lack of interest 
in the other culture, which at certain points becomes downright hostility: “Between the 
two groups […] there is little communication and, instead of fellow-feeling, something 
                                                        
5 Although Trilling (1962) attempted to deflect this criticism, Green (1965) adduced evidence from 
literature in its support. 
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like hostility” (pp. 61, also 13ff).  
 
3.4 Visions of the good society  
 
The contrasting feelings and mutual hostility described above form an amalgam with 
different visions of the good society. This point becomes evident, first of all, in Snow’s 
alleged differences in the evaluation of the industrial revolution. As mentioned above, 
literary intellectuals tended to react negatively to the revolution, if they did not ignore it 
altogether. (The latter claim—that intellectuals simply ignored the revolution—was 
vigorously challenged by Trilling and Leavis.) Unlike members of the traditional culture, 
however,  
 
[f]arsighted men were beginning to see, before the middle of the nineteenth century, that in order 
to go on producing wealth, the country needed to train some of its bright minds in science (p. 23).  
 
Interestingly, pure scientists themselves were slow to appreciate the importance of 
productive industry; according to Snow’s description, poor workers and artisans were 
much quicker to see the benefits of industrialization. Nonetheless, the scientists “found it 
fairly easy to learn,” particularly as the industrial revolution gave way to what Snow calls 
the “scientific revolution” that, by his reckoning, only began in the early twentieth 
century, when science and industry began to forge much closer relationships (pp. 33, 
25ff).  
The different visions of the good society thus appear, first of all, in contrasting 
reactions to industrialization and the expanding use of scientific-technological knowledge 
in society. Members of the scientific culture tend to welcome such developments or to 
carry them further, whereas literary intellectuals either remain indifferent or criticize 
them. Snow goes on, however, to connect this initial contrast with a particular view on 
the part of scientists about the most pressing problem confronting the planet and, 
correlatively, what constitutes the leading point of social betterment. The problem, in his 
view, is the gap between the rich and poor nations; the most important social 
improvement thus consist in overcoming that gap, “to remove unnecessary suffering from 
a billion and a half human lives,” primarily by spreading the material benefits of science 
and technology around the globe (pp. 78, also 41ff, 77ff).6 Indeed, he continues, the 
“scientific revolution is the only method by which most people can gain the primal things 
(years of life, freedom from hunger, survival for children)” (p. 79ff). Whereas scientists 
are ready to tackle this problem (and, he naively predicts, will solve it by turn of the 
millennium), literary intellectuals remain complacent or even resistant. 
Snow’s claim about the primary problem confronting the globe and its 
technoscientific solution drew some of the sharpest critical reactions. Picking up on one 
of Snow’s expressions that associates material improvement with the availability of jam, 
Leavis said Snow represented the “world in which the vital inspiration, the creative drive, 
is ‘Jam tomorrow’ (if you haven’t any today) or (if you have it today) ‘More jam 
tomorrow.’” In Snow’s ideal world, “’standard of living’ is an ultimate criterion, its 
raising an ultimate aim, a matter of wages and salaries and what you can buy with them, 
                                                        
6 In fact, in his “Second Look,” Snow avowed that he wished he had retained the originally intended title of 
his Rede Lecture, “The Rich and the Poor” (Snow 1965, p. 79). 
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reduced hours of work, and the technological resources that make your increasing leisure 
worth having, so that productivity—the supremely important thing—must be kept on the 
rise, at whatever cost to protesting conservative habit” (Leavis, p. 58ff).7 Snow’s critics, 
in sum, charged him with reducing the good life to the material comforts of 
consumption—a society that some saw as well underway. As an alternative to Snow’s 
“vision of our imminent tomorrow” Leavis pointed to a broader vision, involving 
“mankind […] in full intelligent possession of its full humanity” and, at the institutional 
level, universities centered around “vital English School[s]” (i.e., English departments) 
(Leavis 1972, pp. 60, 63). 
 
4. SNOW’S CULTURES AS CLASHING ARGUMENT CULTURES 
 
In calling Snow’s two cultures “argument cultures,” I do not mean that either science or 
the humanities, as cultures of inquiry and discourse, are reducible to practices of 
argumentation. Rather, I mean that in each of these cultures, members engage in inquiry 
with an eye to making public arguments, whose form and substance are conditioned by 
the cultural context. In this section I want to fill out this contextual thesis. This claim is 
trivial at one level, of course. If we focus on different academic disciplines, where the 
idea of an argument culture has the most purchase, then the difference in subject matters 
leads directly to different styles and standards of cogent argumentation, which in turn 
generate a challenge to interdisciplinary cooperation. What makes Snow’s notion of 
culture interesting, I propose, are two further moves, neither of which is entirely obvious 
as a general feature of a culture of inquiry: first, he calls for greater communication 
between the two cultures; second, he identifies affective and evaluative aspects of 
argument cultures that undermine such communication. I treat each move in turn. 
 
4.1 Cultures as relevant contexts for each other  
 
In his retrospective on Snow, Roger Kimball (1994) argues that the gulf of 
incomprehension Snow identified was trivial: true, the gulf is there, but does it really 
matter? For Kimball, “the more pressing issue concerns the fate of culture in a world 
increasingly determined by science and technology.” Kimball accepts Leavis’ view that 
the sciences do not constitute a culture—which is to say: the sciences cannot provide 
moral guidance—and like Leavis, he accuses Snow of proffering a dim vision of the good 
society, in which culture disappears as a moral force: “culture is no longer an invitation to 
confront our humanity, but a series of opportunities to impoverish it through diversion.” 
In making this argument, however, Kimball accepts the basic fact that the sciences and 
the humanities misunderstand each other, but he believes one should not expect 
otherwise, given the challenges of disciplinary specialization. The sciences and 
humanities pursue such different objects of knowledge, that neither culture, as a context 
of inquiry and argument, remains relevant to the other’s inquiry and argument. Their 
divorce is a trivial matter, not worthy of concern.  
Snow challenges just that assumption. Although he reserves his harshest 
                                                        
7 Roger Kimball (1994) seconds Leavis’ assessment: “In the end, Snow is a naïve meliorist. For him, a 
society’s material standard of living provides the ultimate, and really only, criterion of ‘the good life’; 
science is the means of raising the standard of living, ergo science is the arbiter of value.” 
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criticisms for literary intellectuals, he does not fail to recognize the impoverishment that 
non-communication produces on both sides: the “polarization is sheer loss to us all” (pp. 
11, also 13ff). Snow in effect claims that the two cultures, as contexts of inquiry and 
discourse, are relevant for each other.  
However, the precise nature of this cross-context relevance, the sort of 
communication Snow envisions, remains unclear in his Two Cultures. Many remarks 
imply that Snow envisions a kind of moral discourse, in which humanists learn to revise 
their moral vision by accepting the future-oriented optimism of scientists. As we have 
seen, Leavis and Kimball reject that idea as the very antithesis of culture—why regard 
scientists as our moral guardians?8 At one point, Snow hints that the “clashing point of 
two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures—of two galaxies, so far as that goes—ought to 
produce creative chances. In the history of mental activity that has been where some of 
the breakthroughs came” (p. 16). But what sort of “breakthroughs” could possibly arise 
from communication between a literary critic and, say, a high-energy physicist? A more 
compelling piece of science fiction? Snow is elusive on that point. One might, perhaps, 
point to works of fiction that confront us with the disturbing implications of certain 
scientific hypotheses, as A Clockwork Orange did with behavioural psychology. 
In my opinion, Snow’s most plausible statement of the kind of communication he 
has in mind comes out only toward the end of his “Second Look”:  
 
It is dangerous to have two cultures which can’t or don’t communicate. In a time when science is 
determining much of our destiny, that is, whether we live or die, it is dangerous in the most 
practical terms. Scientists can give bad advice and decision-makers can’t know whether it is good 
or bad. On the other hand, scientists in a divided culture provide a knowledge of some 
potentialities which is theirs alone. All this makes the political process more complex, and in some 
ways more dangerous, than we should be prepared to tolerate for long, either for purposes of 
avoiding disasters, or for fulfilling […] a definable social hope (p. 98). 
 
In this passage Snow has his finger on the problem of expertise in policymaking contexts 
(cf. Snow 1961). This problem is indeed plausible, having been on the agenda for more 
than a century, and it now has the growing attention of scholars working in science and 
technology studies (STS).9 Here a kind of moral discourse should indeed take place, 
albeit a discourse in which humanists have an equal voice and, pace Snow, do not simply 
bow to the alleged moral superiority and foresight of scientists.  
 Notice too how Snow expands the horizon in the above quotation. No longer are 
simply two academic cultures at issue, but rather the relationship between scientific 
inquiry and policymaking. Indeed, the kind of danger Snow describes potentially applies 
to any boundary context where scientific arguments and findings bear on practical 
decisions, be they personal, medical, political, legal, or administrative. Thus the more 
general point we can draw from Snow is this: at the boundaries of science and society, 
quite different cultures of inquiry and discourse, as contexts of cogent argumentation with 
subject matters as far apart as fiction and physics, can become relevant for each other. 
Such cross-context relevance can take different forms (see Rehg 2009b). Here it means 
                                                        
8 In fact, by 1959 there was a strong trend to assert the “moral equivalence” of scientists, i.e., to claim that 
scientists were no more virtuous than the ordinary person, were just as liable to self-interested and mundane 
motives; see Shapin 2008, chap. 3. 
9 The problem of expertise is as old as Plato; for work in STS, see Chilvers 2008; Lengwiler 2008; Collins 
and Evans 2007; Turner 2001.  
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that when some question Q arises at the boundary of science and society—as such 
questions can in expert advisory committees—that question concerns both cultures. 
Consequently, arguments made in one culture C1 about the proper answer to Q deserve 
consideration in the other culture C2, where the cogency of arguments from C1 are 
legitimately subject to further critical scrutiny. The opposite relation might also hold. But 
this is hardly a pleasant prospect, given Snow’s second move, his emphasis on the 
affective side of culture. 
 
4.2 Argument cultures as clashing contexts  
 
The idea that diverse argument cultures, as diverse as fiction and physics, can be relevant 
contexts for the evaluation of one another’s arguments, is readily supported by 
contemporary controversies at the science-society boundary. The most obvious cases are 
those that involve decisions about the direction of scientific research, the adoption of 
some new technology, or the regulation of some previously unregulated area of social 
life. Ought we to direct more medical research to the cure of rare cancers, or to 
combating malaria? Shall we promote the construction of nuclear power plants to meet 
looming energy demands? Must international rules be established regulating the conduct 
of pharmaceutical trials in poor nations? Scientists clearly have a role in answering such 
questions, which all involve technical considerations that bear on any assessment of the 
prospects and consequences of possible courses of action.  
 But other non-scientific cultures of inquiry have something to say about such 
questions as well, a point that Snow tended to downplay or ignore altogether. STS 
research has now established the importance of local folk knowledge in answering many 
such questions (see Collins and Evans 2007; Fischer 2000; Wynne 1989). One can extend 
the point to the humanities. These too have a place at the table, at least in the broader 
public discourse, if not directly on every expert committee. Literary cultures in particular, 
by which I mean not only fiction and poetry but also film, have the means to pose the 
existential aspects of the question—for example, to depict the human costs of unregulated 
clinical trials in Africa, as in Le Carré’s Constant Gardener (2001). In doing so, they 
confront us with our humanity and pose the question of the good society in graphic terms. 
Such depictions constitute contexts for evaluating scientists’ claims about the benefits of 
some proposed technology, or claims about the importance of a line of research. They 
bring abstract scientific arguments and statistics down to the earth of concrete human 
experience. But as contributions to a public discourse, literary depictions may not 
proceed arbitrarily: narratives and films are open to potential criticism for distorting the 
facts. To that extent, literary works are subject to scientific evaluation.10  
 However, if cultures as diverse as fiction and physics are relevant for each other, 
then the differences in subject matter and style of argumentation, which make 
communication so difficult, can hardly be waved off as a trivial problem of no concern. If 
two contexts are mutually relevant, then cross-communication is a legitimate demand. 
But differences in style of argument are the least of our worries. Such differences are 
tractable—one can learn different vocabularies and styles of argument, as rhetoric of 
                                                        
10 A recent example is Michael Crichton’s State of Fear (2004), which boils down to a literary argument, 
complete with footnotes citing scientific journal articles, against the environmental movement; in making 
such an argument, Crichton’s work calls for critical evaluation from a scientific perspective. 
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science scholars in English departments indeed have. Snow ups the ante by associating 
cultures with different “tones of feeling,” including mutual hostility, and emotionally 
laden visions of the good society. If Snow’s conception of culture applies to the different 
groups that we expect to sit down and reason together at the boundaries of science and 
society, then a certain amount of mutual disdain should not surprise us. Indeed, this 
surmise has been documented even within scientific culture, as in the case of the multi-
disciplinary controversy over the cause of the dinosaur’s extinction (Officer and Page 
1996, pp. 9ff, 77-81). Nor should we be surprised that, more or less below the surface, 
parties are clashing over different evaluations of what is socially desirable. This kind of 
clash is particularly clear, for example, in the debates over embryonic stem cell research 
in the United States. Such clashes tend to be emotionally charged, precisely because they 
partly turn on visions of the good to which participants are deeply attached. If Snow is 
right about argument cultures, then affective sources of conflict pose a significant 
challenge for public deliberation and policymaking. However, the problem involves a 
deeper layer of conflict, which I take up next. 
 
5. ARGUMENT CULTURES AND COMMON GOODS 
 
Up to this point I have attempted to ferret out a conception of an argument culture from 
Snow’s Two Cultures and its critics. I now develop a connection between argument 
cultures and conflicting notions of the common good, which has further implications for 
the clash of argument cultures. But before I tackle that issue I first recapitulate the 
conception of an argument culture in more precise terms, insofar as precision is possible 
in such matters.  
 
5.1 Argument cultures in sum  
 
As I understand the anthropological concept, to identify a distinct culture minimally 
presupposes that one can identify a (more or less bounded or well-defined) collection or 
group of human beings, who live or interact in some socially/institutionally structured 
setting or locale, such that their living together and interacting within that setting allows 
them to sustain and develop a more or less shared group ethos, i.e., some characteristic 
set of ideas, beliefs, norms, goals, social practices, etc. The qualifier “more or less” 
(bounded or well-defined, shared) is necessary to allow for the complexities and 
ambiguities of cultural membership—identifying a culture is not like defining a 
biological species. By combining this concept with the classical concept of culture, Snow 
in effect introduces a condition that members have been (or are being) educated into a 
practice of inquiry, discourse, and creative expression. However, Snow also includes 
affective elements in his conception, which further specify the content of the ethos. 
Finally, if we understand Snow’s conception of culture as an argument culture, then we 
must introduce a further condition to the effect that the ethos conditions argumentation.  
Putting the above features together, we get the following set of conditions for 
identifying a distinct argument culture (AC). That is, one must identify:   
 
(i) a more or less well-defined collection or group of human beings,  
(ii) who have been (or are being) educated into a practice of inquiry, discourse, 
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and creative expression, and 
(iii) who interact in some socially/institutionally structured setting or locale,   
(iv) such that their interacting within that setting allows them to sustain and 
develop their practice of inquiry and expression (ii above) as part of a more or less 
shared ethos that is characteristic of the group, that is, 
(v) a set of ideas, beliefs, assumptions, norms, goals, social practices, and 
affective dispositions, including affectively charged evaluations (a vision of the 
good society), which 
(vi) condition what counts as cogent argumentation for members of the culture. 
 
These conditions are either explicit in Snow’s text or presupposed by it. When we put 
them together, however, a disturbing conclusion emerges. If argument cultures are 
contexts of argument (as in (vi) above), and if such cultures include affectively charged 
evaluations, then such evaluations and feelings condition what members regard as a 
cogent argument. 
 But hasn’t that point been obvious for millennia? After all, Aristotle spent 
considerable time in his Rhetoric detailing the ins and outs of pathos. However, the above 
analysis goes a step farther, linking pathos not simply with audience and rhetorical 
occasion but with cultures of inquiry. More to the point, Snow’s analysis implies that 
arguments are conditioned by emotionally charged visions of the good society that 
characterize entire cultures of inquiry. This claim hardly appears obvious, indeed we 
might wonder how it could possibly be true for technically circumscribed forms of 
inquiry. To be sure, I have not insisted that Snow accurately described scientists and 
humanists in every respect. My interest lies with his conception itself. But does that 
conception find any real examples? Do such cultures actually exist? I think they do, but 
probably at a different level than Snow initially supposed. As he later admitted, he had 
characterized two English subcultures, at best. So perhaps argument cultures in the above 
sense of (AC) are more likely to exist as micro-cultures. However, some controversies, 
such as the stem-cell and creationist debates in the United States, indicate that argument 
cultures can be larger, though they might not neatly divide by discipline. In any case, the 
presence of such controversies at the boundaries of science and society suggests that 
(AC) presents an interesting hypothesis for understanding such debates. I thus take it as 
an open question, awaiting empirical study, as to whether one can in fact identify cultures 
that meet the above six conditions. 
 
5.2 The common good  
 
We can now turn to the common good. When we connect (AC) with that notion, some 
interesting further conclusions follow. The notion of the common good comes into view 
once we notice that a culture or group ethos functions as a kind of common good, as 
various authors have maintained (Hollenbach 2002, chap. 3; Taylor 1990; cf. Tuomela 
2007, p. 7). In calling the ethos a common good, I mean that the ethos is both shared and 
good.  
In saying that argument cultures are shared, I do not refer to a merely fortuitous 
confluence of attitudes, but rather to a kind of collective commitment (see Tuomela 
2007). Through their training into a culture’s practice of inquiry and argument, members 
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(e.g., scientists) come to accept elements of the cultural ethos (standards of conduct in 
experimentation, writing papers, etc.) as binding on their behaviour in the appropriate 
circumstances (i.e., when they act in the role of scientist, say at a conference or in the 
laboratory). Failures to adhere to the ethos typically incur sanctions from other 
members—criticism, puzzlement, marginalization or even expulsion from the culture.  
 In calling the cultural ethos a good, I mean that members regard it as something 
beneficial and therefore promote or sustain it. An ethos can have a two-fold goodness for 
members. On the one hand, it provides the social-institutional conditions for producing 
goods of inquiry, invention, and creative expression: greater understanding of nature in 
the sciences, beneficial technologies in engineering, and compelling works of art in the 
humanities. From that perspective, the ethos is an instrumental good, a means to realizing 
various beneficial intellectual and physical objects. Those realized goods, the products of 
Snow’s two cultures, benefit not only members of the discipline but, allegedly, the whole 
society. On the other hand, the kind of ethos that characterizes an argument culture is not 
merely instrumental, in the way that money is merely a means to acquiring something 
that otherwise has no relation to money. There are at least two reasons for this. First, 
insofar as an argument culture exemplifies culture in the classical sense, it involves a 
cultivation of intellectual excellence on the part of its members. This is clearest in the 
case of pure science and the humanities. One cannot enjoy the products of those cultures 
without participating in the cultures themselves and attaining a modicum of the mental 
development they demand. One cannot appreciate a work of art if one has no 
understanding of the ethos from which that work emerged, and one can appreciate a 
scientific advance only in the barest sense if one has no curiosity about nature or sense of 
the challenges scientists overcame in making the advance. Second, education into an 
argument culture tends to form the personal identity of members. Although some 
members might pursue a career in some field merely as a routine job, I suspect that many, 
particularly those at the doctoral level, enter a particular discipline because it fits with 
their personal interests and aspirations for life. The ethos for them cannot be merely 
instrumental, bound up as it is with their sense of who they are and want to be, what they 
hope to achieve in life.  
 If a cultural ethos is a non-instrumental common good in the above sense, then we 
can make sense of the idea that argument cultures have an affective dimension, including 
possibly a level of disdain for other cultures. As noted above, education into an argument 
culture requires one to join in a collective commitment, which becomes stronger the 
farther one advances. Like most strong commitments, the commitment to the goodness of 
a shared practice of inquiry is likely to carry considerable emotional charge for those who 
have made that commitment over the course of their education. And in grasping the 
goodness of one’s own way of inquiry and argument, one can be tempted to dismiss other 
forms of argument as second-rate, shoddy, or even delusional. Consider also the fact that 
successful members’ grasp of the goodness of their ethos or argument culture lies, to a 
significant extent, at an experiential level. For them, the goodness of an ethos is as much 
felt as it is intellectually justified. As members’ experiential sense of their disciplinary 
practice develops in the course of their education and ongoing participation in the 
practice, they can become increasingly convinced of its obviously compelling character, 
its right to prominence in any educational curriculum, more so than other disciplines.  
 Members become convinced of the goodness of their disciplinary culture through 
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their ongoing participation in its practice. This conviction involves two things: 
commitment to a practical conception of cogent argumentation, and commitment to the 
value of the products of one’s inquiry and argument. I thus propose a critical 
hermeneutical principle: when two argument cultures advance competing visions of the 
good society, in the manner Snow describes, one should ask whether their members 
might be projecting convictions about the common goods of their respective practices 
onto society at large. In fact, the controversy between Snow and his main critics seems to 
confirm this suspicion. Although Snow spoke in a literary style in his Rede Lecture, he 
essentially spoke from the standpoint of the scientific culture in which he had originally 
been educated. As a former scientist, Snow had become committed to the common goods 
of the technoscientific culture—above all to its technological products.11 Because science 
and engineering could and did produce material benefits, Snow took that goal as the 
primary norm for general social betterment: basic material benefits are the most pressing 
common good. Conversely, Leavis and Trilling were committed to the products of 
literature, works that confront us with our humanity and the ultimate question of human 
existence. Consequently, they could not abide any vision of the good society that would 
give priority to material comforts—as Snow’s vision did. Rather, they envisioned a 
society in which the humanities would play the central role. 
 The remarks on Snow and his critics are conjectural, to be sure. But given the 
conception of an argument culture, the proposed hermeneutical principle is reasonable: 
the affective aspect of a cultural ethos makes it understandable that members could tend 
to develop a particular conception of the common good for a whole society, in which 
their contribution would play the central or most necessary role. Notice that on this 
analysis, one need not appeal to crass expectations of personal gain, nor need one deny 
that the goods at issue are real. The principle follows from the normative aspects of an 
argument culture and its goals. Because members have first-hand experience of the 
common goodness of their ethos and its products, it is obvious (to them) that those 
products are essential components of a good society. 
 
6. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE 
OF PUBLIC ARGUMENTATION 
 
The foregoing analysis has, I propose, implications not only for science-intensive 
policymaking contexts, such as expert advisory committees, but also for cross-context 
argumentation in general. As I have developed it, the idea of an argument culture applies 
most readily to modes of inquiry and discourse that tend to be associated with academic 
disciplines. Although argument cultures are not confined to school settings, they 
presuppose training in a mode of inquiry or discourse, and thus tend to draw their 
membership, first of all, from educational institutions. As distinct contexts whose 
standards, norms, and background assumptions condition argumentation in culture-
specific ways, argument cultures can clash wherever two or more cultures converge on 
the same question—thus in any collaborative or deliberative setting in which some 
hypothesis or political-legal outcome calls for input from different epistemic 
perspectives. These clashes become all the more intense insofar as members are 
committed to different emotion-laden conceptions of what counts as cogent 
                                                        
11 Cf. Snow 1961; on Snow’s background as a failed scientist, see Collini (1998, xvii-xxii). 
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argumentation and good inquiry. Such clashes have been documented in STS, not only 
within the sciences, that is, in multidisciplinary debates, such as the dinosaur extinction 
controversy (see Glen 1994), but also in science-intensive policymaking contexts, where 
one can find tensions between technocratic and democratic models of good policymaking 
(see Jasanoff 1990).  
 Does the idea of an argument culture extend beyond cultures of inquiry and 
discourse? That is, might we regard any interest group or subcultural perspective in 
political deliberation as a potential argument culture? I think we might indeed, insofar as 
(a) these perspectives are held by members of some group (and not merely individually), 
and (b) members committed to the perspective are also committed to a particular mode of 
inquiry or discourse distinctive of the perspective. Religious groups, for example, 
typically include members who have been trained in a style of theological inquiry whose 
standards, methods, values, and assumptions depend in some measure on the particular 
religion. Thus evangelical Christians tend to argue by relying heavily on Biblical 
authority, whereas Catholic bishops, when they speak publicly, often draw on 
philosophical lines of argument. Such groups tend to have rather fully elaborated visions 
of the good society (e.g., Catholic social doctrine).  
 If this extension goes through, then the idea of an argument culture has rather 
general application for the understanding of political discourse. It also complicates the 
analysis of discourse, inasmuch as we would have to expect that any given participant 
might bring a mixed background of argument cultures to the table—for example, a 
biologist with strong religious convictions. Even if we hesitate to extend the idea that 
way, three further implications appear plausible. I close by briefly sketching these. 
(1) Today we expect that public deliberation on political issues will often involve 
different groups whose positions on specific proposals are grounded in competing visions 
of justice, a good society, and the common good. In pluralistic societies, the parties to 
deliberation are likely to have different religious and ethnic worldviews. Snow’s 
conception of argument cultures complicates this picture by suggesting that different 
ideas of the good society can arise not merely from the usual subcultural groups and 
special interests, but from the very disciplines of inquiry that provide methods and 
information for guiding reasonable debate. That is, the experts whose role is to inform or 
advise policymakers and citizens, or to develop methods of structuring deliberation, 
might themselves harbour strong commitments to different visions of the good society 
that then influence their contributions. If so, then they do not assist deliberation as neutral 
advisors, but enter the fray as additional interested parties.  
In putting together expert committees, this possibility must be kept in mind. 
Notice, however, that the problem is not quite the standard concern about conflicts of 
interest that skew a scientist’s judgment on topics that touch on, say, the interests of a 
corporate sponsor. At the National Academy of the Sciences, for example, potential 
committee members must report such conflicts of interest, which are assumed to arise 
from a scientist’s funding sources or corporate affiliations, and outside criticisms of 
expert knowledge often tend to target just this sort of conflict (Brown 2008; Hilgartner 
2000, pp. 63-65, 91-98; Boffey 1975). But Snow’s analysis suggests a subtler scenario, 
one in which the scientific expert projects the common good of his or her practice of 
inquiry onto the public stage, as the good for a whole society. Among the clearest 
examples are the proposals by some scientists and writers in the past century for a world 
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government by scientists (e.g., H. G. Wells, Leo Szilard). Snow seems to have fallen into 
a similar trap when he takes science and technology as the only path to overcoming 
global inequality. He thereby projects the material goods of technoscience onto a vision 
of global justice.  
(2) Of course, the projection of the good of a particular argument culture onto 
inquiry in general or onto society as a whole need not, and often does not, occur when 
argument cultures come together or enter political contexts. Such projection is merely a 
possible trap, into which some members of the culture sometimes fall. Nor does the 
problematic character of such projection follow simply from the fact that in projecting, 
one takes a good that one has experienced in one’s own practice and extends it to further 
contexts. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that projection involves a unilateral 
imposition across contexts, rather than a dialogical proposal. In projecting the good with 
which I am familiar onto other disciplines or society as a whole, I overlook shifts in 
context. Nonetheless, the goods internal to, or produced in, one context or culture of 
argument may indeed be relevant for other contexts—they might well deserve 
consideration abroad, as it were. This is just what Snow wanted to argue, I think, when he 
insisted on the relevance of the sciences for social welfare. However, he failed to situate 
his proposal within a broader vision that did justice to the concerns of humanists. In any 
case, Snow’s lecture raises questions for argumentation theory about how we ought 
reasonably to assess the cross-context relevance of the goods of particular argument 
cultures.  
(3) The third implication I want to mention concerns deliberate efforts to work 
across disciplinary boundaries, say in interdisciplinary research teams or in expert 
committees charged with producing a report on some science-intensive question. If my 
analysis is on target, then we should expect such initiatives to involve clashes of 
argument cultures, at least to some extent—tensions generated in the collaboration by the 
members’ different training experiences, background knowledge, methods of inquiry and 
experiences of good science. Given that each member is strongly committed to his or her 
particular argument culture and its disciplinary ethos as a common good, clashes within 
the collaborative enterprise can become emotionally charged, as members disagree on 
what counts as a cogent argument or report.  
In fact, one can see such clashes between subdisciplinary groups. In his detailed 
study of the large collaboration at Fermilab responsible for the discovery of the top quark, 
Kent Staley (2004) describes a clash between two subcultures in the physics community. 
The Collider Detector at Fermilab (or CDF) Collaboration—named for the particular 
system of detectors the collaboration employed, and involving around 450 scientists—
relied on a number of different methods of detecting high energy events and analyzing 
data. The collaboration thus involved a number of subgroups dedicated to different 
methods. In 1992-1993, the data they collected by these different methods pointed to the 
existence of the top quark, a subatomic particle that had been theoretically predicted but 
not yet detected in high energy events. To present their findings, the collaboration 
undertook a process of writing a lengthy paper arguing that the team had found evidence 
for the existence of the top quark. But an acrimonious controversy arose within the 
collaboration over whether the analysis of a particular subgroup actually contributed to 
the evidence—in effect, whether that analysis supplied additional inductive support for 
the top-quark hypothesis. The kinematics group employed methods that many of the other 
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physicists, less familiar with that type of analysis, did not entirely trust. In part, the 
controversy involved two argument subcultures in the physics community: physicists 
comfortable with kinematic analysis, which involved arcane mathematics and computer 
simulations, and those committed to the more straightforward counting methods, which 
sought the quark in statistically significant numbers of certain types of high energy 
events.12 In the end, the collaboration included the kinematic data merely as consistent 
with the evidence supplied by counting methods—not as evidence per se but as a kind of 
cross-check. One member of the kinematics group, however, remained skeptical of the 
evidence supplied by the counting methods. 
 To overcome such clashes, members of collaborations and multidisciplinary 
advisory committees must learn to forge a new heterogeneous argument culture that 
allows them to work together toward a common goal—be it a longer-range research goal, 
an ongoing advisory obligation, or simply a one-shot report or paper. If such groups are 
to become genuine argument cultures, then presumably their collaboration must involve 
or develop the conditions I listed above (sec. 5.1). But rather than assume that their 
scientific training already prepares them for cooperation within a shared argument 
culture, members of the group must educate themselves, in the very course of their 
collaboration, into a suitable practice of inquiry that creates a shared ethos of 
argumentation. In fact, Staley’s study reveals that the scientists at Fermilab did just that. 
They constructed a fairly sophisticated set of procedures for writing their paper on 
evidence for the top quark. Those procedures distinguished different roles and set forth 
rules for a more civil, inclusive mode of discussion—a set of institutionalized norms for 
dialectically adequate critical discussion (for details, see Staley 2004, chap. 4; Rehg and 
Staley 2008; Rehg 2009a, chap. 6). Insofar as such procedures support an argument 
culture within the collaboration, they help scientists to achieve a kind of heterogeneous 
solidarity in pursuit of a common intellectual goal. 
 There also seems to be evidence for such heterogeneous argument cultures in 
regulatory science domains, where scientific experts from various disciplines must work 
together with each other and with administrators to produce technical advice for science-
intensive policymaking. Studies of expertise suggest that regulatory science works best 
when committee procedures and membership rules serve to foster a style of interaction 
and argument that is both participatory and consensual. Participatory, because the 
effective application of scientific knowledge beyond the laboratory depends on diverse 
forms of experience, including that of lay persons informed about local contexts of 
application. Consensual, in order to avoid the counterproductive effects of an overly 
dictatorial technocratic style on the one hand, and an overly contentious adversarial style 
on the other (Collins and Evans 2007; Chilvers 2008; Jasanoff 1990). Western polities 
have developed characteristic regulatory argument cultures—or as Sheila Jasanoff puts it, 
“civic epistemologies”—that differ in how well they meet these requirements. For 
example, in the area of biotechnology regulation, the United States tends to have a 
contentious style, Great Britain leans toward a communitarian approach, and Germany 
uses a more consensual civic epistemology (Jasanoff 2005, chap. 10).  
                                                        
12 I simply significantly: the kinematics controversy was not the only debate in the collaboration, and it also 
involved charges of data-sharing with non-collaboration members, as well as problems with the ethos and 
pathos of the involved scientists; see Rehg 2009a, 176-79; on counting versus kinematic methods, and the 
kinematics controversy, see Staley 2004, 113-30. 
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 My remarks on the above implications remain sketchy, I admit. But I hope they 
provide at least some grounds for thinking that Snow may have something to say to 
argumentation theorists today, fifty years after he delivered his famous lecture on “The 
Two Cultures.” 
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